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OKLAHOMA'S VICTIM IMPACT LEGISLATION: A
NEW VOICE FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR COYNE
SEN. BROOKS DOUGLASS*
In his recent article "Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma,"' Professor Randall Coyne
takes critical aim at Oklahoma's new legislation authorizing "victim impact"
testimony during the sentencing phase of criminal trials. As the author of this
legislation, I take this opportunity to respond to his criticisms. Although I lack
Professor Coyne's scholarly credentials, I hope to articulate the reasons for my
support of victim impact statements, and to express my strong conviction that they
advance the cause of justice by helping swing the pendulum back in favor of
victims.2
The purpose of the criminal justice system is to promote justice by balancing the
interests of the state against the interests of the accused. The interests of the state
are to protect the people by enforcing laws and to punish those who violate the laws
in order to deter the offender and others from committing future crimes. The
interest of the accused should be to receive a fair trial. In order to guarantee this
right, there are many issues involved in determining whether or not a person is
receiving a fair trial. These issues arise at the moment of the first accusation and
subsequent issuance of a warrant, and culminate in the need to tailor the punishment
to the crime once guilt has been determined.
While the rights of crime victims are a recent discovery, protection of the rights
of the accused has always been a major concern in American criminal jurisprudence.
This is evidenced most explicitly by those protections expressed in the first ten
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. A defendant possesses freedom from
compulsory self-incrimination.' He is protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures.4 He has the right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers.5 He is protected
* Oklahoma State Senator, District 40. J.D., M.B.A., 1990, Oklahoma City University School of
Law; B.B.A., 1980, Baylor University. Senator Douglass was elected as Senate Minority Whip for the
first session of the 44th legislature in 1993.
1. Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence During the
Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 589 (1992).
2. While I hope that my argument will stand on its own merits, I will also refer to some of my own
experiences with the criminal justice system. I do not believe that they necessarily "prove" anything, and
I offer them by way of illustration only. However, I do think it appropriate to draw upon them, since
Professor Coyne made reference to my personal experiences in his article.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
4. Id. amend. IV.
5. Id. amend. VI.
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against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. These rights have been
interpreted to include the right to appeal,7 the right to competent legal counsel, and,
if the defendant is indigent, the right to legal counsel at the state's expense.
Moreover, from my own Ake v. Oklahoma,' the Supreme Court determined that
where, in a capital case, the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime is at
issue, the state must also aid an indigent accused in preparation of his defense by
providing a psychiatrist.
These are rights held dear by every citizen, and we must all work diligently to
protect them. In its role as protector of the people, the state must ensure that the
correct person is convicted and appropriately sentenced. Every citizen must be
confident that if he is accused of a crime, these enumerated protections will be
available to him.
However, over the past twenty years the courts have gone to such lengths to
ensure these rights of the defendant that these protections have become a sword
rather than a shield in the hands of the defendant. The courts have created a system
far more responsive to the defendant rather than the laws of the state, the people of
the state, the prosecutor, witnesses, or the victims themselves. The insanity defense,
for example, was designed to apply to a limited number of murder cases - either
those involving clinically observable mental illnesses, or those in which the
defendant "loses it" and takes the life of another in a moment of moral incapacity.
Yet this defense, appropriate only in the rarest of cases, is now routinely used. In
fact, since Ake, a defendant is probably insane if he does not at least attempt to
plead insanity.
As in most political arenas, a pendulum swings between the interests of the
prosecution and the defense, and rarely does it appear to find its way to the middle
and strike a proper balance between the two. The public becomes more outraged
while the criminal justice system, which seems far more concerned with the rights
of criminals than with justice, appears to spin out of control. Scarcely a day goes
by without a newspaler or television report of a defendant saved from jail by a plea
bargain, or acquitted due to a technical flaw in the trial. More and more frequently,
we see inmates released on parole or under pre-parole supervision, serving only a
small percentage of the punishment. Often, of course, parolees abuse their freedom
by committing further crimes. It is difficult to explain to the victim of a crime that
the person who harmed her is already back out on the streets after having previously
been convicted of other crimes. It is precisely such events that erode the public's
confidence in the criminal justice system - a system supposedly designed to
protect them.
The victim of a crime committed by a criminal released from prison has already
been betrayed by the system. Unfortunately, she will again be victimized by the
6. Id. amend. V.
7. Although the Constitution does not provide a convicted criminal the right to appeal a conviction,
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977), the right is granted pursuant to federal statute. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
8. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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system's complete indifference to her plight. Once they make their statement to the
authorities, crime victims are essentially ignored, unless and until they are called
upon to testify. If they are called, legal procedure limits their testimony to the
specific facts concerning the events that took place during the commission of the
crime. The victim impact statement is an effort to provide a voice to victims and
their families, and to allow them a small role in the system.
I would note in passing that Payne v. Tennessee,9 the Supreme Court decision
underlying Oklahoma's victim impact legislation, has been unfairly characterized by
its detractors. While Payne does overrule the Court's previous holding in Booth v.
Maryland," it is not a bad decision simply on that account; the doctrine of stare
decisis should not be an absolute bar to the evolution of the law. The Constitution
of the United States is a "living" document that changes with the ebb and flow of
values in American society. It has survived for over two hundred years by being
able to meet the pressures of a changing country. Our society has faced many
challenges, both social and technological, that were unforeseeable by the framers yet
the Constitution has been able to deal with them precisely because of its flexibility.
The Supreme Court, as the final interpreter of the Constitution, has a duty not only
to apply it to an ever-changing society, but also to correct its own excesses. The
death penalty, for example, which after Furman v. Georgia" was in danger of
judicial abolition, has now been firmly upheld in decisions that better reflect the
original intent of the framers and the moral intuitions of most Americans.
We are once again at a time in history when the Court appears to be correcting
its mistakes, and is beginning to see that it ventured further than society wanted to
go in protecting the rights of criminals. Payne is not an irrational break from
precedent, but a decision that addresses a fundamental unfairness in the criminal
justice system. The Court must break from precedent when it neither serves the best
interests of the people nor reflects their beliefs. Sometimes that break only occurs
when the makeup of the Court changes - but it is surely incorrect to suggest that
the break from precedent is illegitimate merely on that account.
That is what has happened recently in Payne. New members of the Court who
reflect current values on timely issues can bring those values to the Court as they
shape its decisions. Because this process moves so slowly, the Court does not
change with every whim of society but reflects only major trends in changing
societal values. The "victims' movement" is one such change; the result of decades
during which our rights to be safe in our own homes has been eroded by expanding
and enhancing rights for criminals. Many people have worked to restore balance to
the system - not by reducing the rights of defendants, but by increasing rights of
victims. Payne is a step in that direction.
Professor Coyne's thorough discussion of the decisions in Booth and Payne
outlines the logical tensions between these two decisions and concludes that Payne
9. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
10. 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987).
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19931
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is inconsistent with the Court's prior rulings. But another conclusion is possible
namely, that Payne corrects the Court's mistakes in Booth.
In Booth, victim impact statements by several members of the murder victims'
family were read to the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial after Booth was
convicted for murder. The evidence offered was of three types: personal character-
istics of the victims, emotional impact on the family, and the opinions and
characterizations of the crimes and the defendant. The Court focused its analysis on
whether the victim impact evidence "suitably directed" the jury's discretion or
increased the risk of an "arbitrary and capricious" decision in determining whether
or not the death penalty should be imposed. 2 The majority found that the Eighth
Amendment was violated by the victim impact evidence because it increased the
likelihood that the jury would act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 3 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, discussed a number of issues which led
the Court to that conclusion. 4
Foremost in the majority's reasoning was the concern that victim impact
statements forced the jury to assign a relative social "value" to the victim when
determining whether or not to impose the death penalty.'" This was also the central
concern for Professor Coyne and other critics of the Payne decision. However, what
the critics are objecting to is an intrinsic feature of any jury trial. With or without
victim impact statements, it is always possible that a jury will judge the defendant
on the basis of its feelings for the victim.
Not only is the concern of victim "valuation" overstated, but it is also irrelevant
to the legitimate role played by victim impact statements. The important issue in
sentencing is that the jury be given a clear picture of the entire crime. Information
about the victim must be seen as relevant in order to accomplish this task. That the
victim is a drug dealer or has a history of causing harm to others is as important for
the jury to know as it the victim were a minister.
Payne provides part of the constitutional framework for the victims' rights bills
that I have authored since becoming a member of the Oklahoma Senate. Professor
Coyne refers to the "innocuous" title of Senate Bill 8166 as though the entire bill
deals only with the victim impact statement. Much of Senate Bill 816 does deal
with the definition and function of victim impact statements. But the bill
accomplishes several other important tasks, including revisions to the statutes
controlling the Victim's Compensation Fund. In addition, it requires that the
Victim-Witness Coordinator for each district attorney's office keep victims informed
of the status of the case.
12. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)).
13. Id. at 509.
14. Some of the issue; addressed by Justice Powell were: (1) whether the presence or absence of
emotional distress of the victim's family was relevant; (2) whether the victim's personal characteristics
are proper sentencing considerations; (3) the importance of the background and record of the accused
and the particular circumstinces of the crime. Id. at 496.
15. Id. at 504.
16. S.B. 816, 43d Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (Okla.) (enacted).
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Senate Bill 816 also includes a privacy provision for victims of crime which
allows them to request that personal information about the victim be deleted from
court records when there is a danger that such information may be used in bringing
further harm to the victim. This provision is particularly relevant in rape cases. A
number of instances have been reported in which suspects released on bail have
simply walked down the hall of the courthouse and obtained a detailed police report
containing the victim's name, address, telephone number, place of employment, and
other personal information. They have then used this information to stalk and haunt
the victim, either to discourage the victim from testifying, or simply to gratify a
desire for revenge. While the privacy provision is a difficult procedure to
implement and the suspect may acquire this information elsewhere, it was my
feeling that the police and courts should not be doing the criminal's homework for
him.
As for the victim impact statement portion of Senate Bill 816 and its companion,
House Bill 2271,'" we intended these provisions only to provide the jury with a
complete picture of the crime committed by the defendant. In case after case, the
defendant's entire family is permitted to parade across the witness stand, tearfully
testifying about the defendant's basic goodness, his deprived childhood, and his
victimization by circumstances. These sentiments are then echoed by the defendant's
first grade teacher, Sunday school teacher, and minister.
On the other hand, the jury has no information about the victim whatsoever. In
fact, Professor Coyne's recommendation that defense attorneys subpoena the family
members in order to invoke the rule of sequestration is already standard practice
with most defense counsel. Family members of the victim are virtually always
subpoenaed by defense counsel, with no intention of calling them to testify, simply
to keep them out of the sight of the jury. The jury is made up of members of the
community impanelled to act as the conscience of the community. In order to do
so, they must be required to hear the full extent of the crime. To keep victims and
their families out of courtroom proceedings only victimizes them further and gives
them the (completely justified) feeling that they have no say in the process. A
victim, or member of the victim's family, should be permitted to talk of the
emotional, psychological, financial, and perhaps physical impact of the crime upon
the victim and family. These are the direct and proximate results of the crime
committed.
If the victim impact evidence angers the jury, perhaps it should. It should be
remembered that these statements are.not made during the guilt or innocence phase
of a trial. Guilt has already been determined. What remains is to recommend a
sentence suitable to the crime. Suitability is not susceptible to dispassionate
calculation because jurors, like all people, are not machines. They are in the
courtroom to act as the conscience of the community. If the commission of the
crime and its surrounding circumstances would outrage a normal person, they will,
and should, outrage the jury. This is not to say that the jury will then act in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. In fact, it is possible that a lack of outrage can
17. H.B. 2271, 43d Leg., 2d Sess. (1992) (Okla.) (enacted).
1993]
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lead in some cases to a sentence that is arbitrary and capricious because it does not
fit the crime.
As Professor Coyne points out, the victim impact evidence can work both ways.
I agree that a family member of the victim who wants a lesser sentence should be
allowed to testify as well, and Senate Bill 816 does not prevent such testimony. In
other than a capital crime, some alternate form of retribution may be more
appropriate for the crime and more desirable to the victim. That type of victim
impact evidence should be heard as well.
In February 1986, when Glen Burton Ake was given two life sentences for the
murders of my parents, the judge made a statement that I shall never forget. It was
the only time, other than when I testified, that I was allowed in the courtroom. The
judge looked at Glen Ake, after he had sentenced him, and said:
I am now going to give you your rights. I have no problem with
giving you these rights. You have the right to appeal your conviction
and the sentences. You have the right to a free transcript of these
proceedings if you cannot afford one. . . . I have no problem with
giving you the;e rights. But just one time before I leave the bench, I
hope that I will have the chance to look at a victim of the crime and
read them one single right. It may not happen before I'm gone. I hope
it does. But just one time I would like the opportunity to read a victim
one right."
The victims' rights movement is not merely the product of a conservative fantasy.
Revictimization at the hands of the criminal justice system is real. For crime
victims and their families, the trauma does not end with the commission of the
crime; the criminal justice system subjects them to fresh ordeals, ranging from the
petty to the tragic. In 1979, the year our parents were killed, there was no victims'
rights movement, and no Victim's Compensation Fund in Oklahoma. After the
crime, when I drove my sister and myself to the home of a doctor for medical
attention for our wounds, our blood covered the car seats. The car was then
impounded by the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) as evidence, and
because there was no provision in the law at that time for reimbursement of victims,
I was required to pay the $115 towing and impoundment fees myself.
Hair was pulled from every part of my body by forensics experts for comparison
with that of the defendant's found in the house. I took the witness stand seven
times, each time more painful than the last, to testify against Glen Ake and his
codefendant, Steven Hatch. I was called upon to testify each time they were granted
a new hearing or trial, and every time it took weeks of emotional preparation for
me to confront the people who murdered my parents. Afterwards, it took weeks to
overcome the depresSion and anger I felt after sitting on the stand again.
It is easy to gloss over what "victim impact" means. In our case, "impact"
consisted of my sister having to deal with being raped by both defendants before
18. Transcript of Proceedings at 1720, Oklahoma v. Ake, Nos. CRF-79-302, CRF-79-303, CRF-79-
304, CRF-79-305 (Okla., Canadian County Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 1986).
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they shot us and our parents. I nearly died as a result of the injuries I sustained. I
had to raise myself since the time I was sixteen years of age. I put myself through
college, law school, and a Master's program. Not once was I able to hear my
parents tell me they were proud of me or encourage me in my endeavors. Never did
I know what it was like to "go home" for the weekend or the holidays. For two
years after the incident nightmares prevented me from sleeping more than one hour
each night.
In 1986, I sat on a witness stand in front of twelve jurors who never heard any
of this. All they saw was a twenty-two-year-old college graduate who was running
a successful business and was now in law school. I appeared no worse for wear for
having been shot by the defendant and watching him murder my parents. But the
jurors never heard the truth. They never heard the disastrous consequences that that
very trial had on my law school performance, not to mention the impact the
defendant's actions had on the last seven years of my life. The sentence was life in
prison, with the possibility of parole.
I authored the victim impact legislation in Oklahoma to redress a serious wrong
in our criminal justice system. As a result of its passage, victims and their families
have been given a voice - a voice long denied. Against the many rights of the
accused, the victim now has at least one: to tell a jury the effects of the crime.
Until recently, the victim had no right even to appear at parole hearings. Even now,
the victim is allowed only five minutes to explain why she believes parole should
be granted or denied.
Finally, I wish to thank Professor Coyne for pointing out some of the problems
and inconsistencies in the statute. Most of his criticisms are well taken, and the
ones that are technical in nature were corrected in the last legislative session. In
actual practice, the primary problem with the statute is the reluctance of some
judges to follow it. Some judges interpreted the language requiring victim impact
evidence to be heard by the "court" to mean that victims' statements are authorized
only if the trial is before a judge, and not in jury trials. Therefore, we amended the
statute in the 1993 legislative session to expressly authorize victim impact
statements in trials by jury. Moreover, some judges interpreted the words "family
member" and "victim" to mean that only one such person may present victim impact
evidence at the hearing. This language was also corrected during the last legislative
session.
1993]
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